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THE STATUS AND ROLE OF LEGISLATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AS A CONSTI-
TUTIONAL DEMORACY: SOME EXPLORATORY OBSERVATIONS* 
 
L du Plessis** 
 
"When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court must declare that any 
law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its 
inconsistency." Thus section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution decrees,
1
 subjecting
2
 "law 
or conduct", and thereby legislation as well, to a form of constitutional review rigor-
ous and robust by any standard. Section 172(1)(b) admittedly seeks to mitigate po-
tentially overharsh effects of such review, providing that a court "may make any or-
der that is just and equitable".
3
 Striking down unconstitutional legislation is therefore 
not the only, but arguably the default option. 
 
Section 172(1) must be construed mindful of the section 39(2) injunction that "the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights"
4
 are to be promoted. The section 
172(1) and 39(2) standards of review also apply to all legislation in force when the 
Constitution took effect.
5
 
 
In the face of probably one of the most unequivocal forms of constitutional review in 
a modern day state, all legislation in South Africa has since 27 April 1994 grown in 
status (and stature) nonetheless, and has assumed an unprecedented role in our 
                                            
* Paper presented at the First Konrad Adenauer Foundation and Faculty of Law (North-West Uni-
versity) Human Rights Indaba on The role of Local Government and the Lower Courts in realising 
Socio-economic Rights in North-West, Northern Cape and Free State Provinces held at the 
Feather Hill Spa, Potchefstroom on 29 October 2010. 
** LM du Plessis B.Iur et Comm, B Phil , LLD (PU vir CHO) Hons BA (Stell), research professor, 
Northwest-University, Potchefstroom Campus.(Lourens.duplessis@nwu.ac.za). 
1
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The transitional Constitution, ie the Constitu-
tion of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993, included a provision in a similar vein and to 
the same effect, namely s 98(5). 
2
 Like s 98(5) of the transitional Constitution. 
3
 Section 98(5) of the transitional Constitution included a similar qualification. 
4
 Chapter 2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
5
 Such legislation is to remain in force until amended, repealed or declared unconstitutional; 
schedule 6 item 2(1) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
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constitutional democracy.
6
 In this note I wish to briefly explore this proposition, be-
ginning with a few prosaic observations about statute law,
7
 more or less unconten-
tious (until 27 April 1994 at least) and helpful in establishing a discursive context. 
 
● Legislation together with judicial precedent and custom are generative 
sources of South African statute, case and customary law respectively, in 
other words, means through which legal norms come into force and have ef-
fect. 
● Some scholars distinguish these "formal sources" from the historical or "mate-
rial sources" of South African law, the latter denoting the Roman-Dutch and 
English origins of present-day legal norms and principles. Law deriving from 
these historical sources, augmented by and developed through case and, to a 
lesser extent, customary law, constitutes (the) South African common law. 
● Statute law is indispensable for the regulation of the modern state, but 
whether it is a prime source of origin of South African law has been conten-
tious, due to a curious tension between statute law and common law that ex-
isted under parliamentary sovereignty. Courts, deferring to parliament as sov-
ereign law-maker, endeavoured to give meticulous effect to the intention of 
the supreme legislature, often treating long established precepts of the com-
mon law with disdain in order to give optimum effect to apartheid laws. In ar-
eas (rightly or wrongly) regarded as "politically non-controversial", statute law 
was, however, also treated as an exception to the common law and the for-
mer was construed restrictively vis-à-vis precepts and principles of the latter. 
This state of affairs has, however, been changing since the advent of constitu-
tional democracy. But even in instances where legislation has been held to 
trump the common law, the interpretive paradox that common-law canons of 
construction are relied on to interpret such legislation, has by and large re-
mained, though, generally speaking, constitutionally informed canons of con-
                                            
6
 Constitutional review is, of course, only possible by virtue of the supremacy of the Constitution 
proclaimed in s 2. The Constitution is not self-executing and s 2 merely creates the potential of 
unconstitutionality. Only intervention by a competent court or organ of state can result the 
amendment, repeal or striking-down of legislation. 
7
 These remarks are mainly drawn from Du Plessis "Statute Law and Interpretation" paras 278-
279. 
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struction (like, for example, section 39(2)) have become increasingly signifi-
cant. 
● Finally statutes have binding force because their authors or "makers" are in-
vested with law-making authority (directly
8
 or ultimately
9
 derived from the su-
preme Constitution). Statutes are therefore construed to be valid and of effect 
rather than invalid and of no effect. 
 
I briefly want to deal with three features of our system of constitutional review that 
have not only preserved, but have in actual fact also enhanced the status and stat-
ure of legislation and have assigned to it an unprecedented role as a source of law in 
our constitutional democracy. These factors are, first, the court's exercise of constitu-
tional review with restraint; second, the fact that statutes of a certain kind have be-
come crucial allies of the Constitution, and, third, the enhancement of quality popular 
participation in legislative deliberation. 
 
1 Constitutional review and judicial self-restraint 
 
Certain reading strategies and remedial measures have been designed to help en-
sure that the constitutional review of legislation proceeds with circumspection. Inter-
pretation in conformity with the Constitution - sometimes also referred to as "the pre-
sumption of constitutionality"
10
 - is an example of a reading strategy in this category. 
A prima facie unconstitutional (and by that token potentially impugnable) provision is 
to survive constitutional scrutiny if it can - through the adaption of its language, if so 
required - be read to be constitutional without distorting it or straining its "plain mean-
ing".
11
 Such a reading can be either narrower or more restrictive than other possible 
                                            
8
 In the case of original legislation. 
9
 In the case of delegated legislation. 
10
 Devenish Interpretation of Statutes 210-212; De Ville Constitutional and Statutory Interpretation 
223-225. 
11
 National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 1 BCLR 39 (CC); 
2000 2 SA 1 (CC) para 23; Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Mo-
tor Distributors (Pty) Ltd: in re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit 2000 10 BCLR 1079 
(CC); 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) paras 24-26. See also Laugh it Off Promotions CC v SAB Interna-
tional (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International 2005 8 BCLR 743 (CC); 2006 1 SA 144 (CC); Du 
Toit v Minister of Transport 2005 11 BCLR 1053 (CC); 2006 1 SA 297 (CC) para 29; National Di-
rector of Public Prosecutions v Mohamed 2002 9 BCLR 970 (CC); 2002 2 SACR 196 (CC) para 
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readings, in other words, a reading-down, or a more extensive reading (or one elimi-
nating ambiguity), that is, a "reading-up".
12
 
 
Severance and reading-in are judicially more activist remedial measures that can be 
taken either to restrict or to extend the scope of a statutory provision to rescue it from 
invalidity on constitutional grounds. Through severance that which is unconstitutional 
in an impugned legislative text (literally: words and phrases) are cut off from the rest 
of the text, and struck down, in order to preserve the constitutionally valid remainder 
of the text.
13
 Reading-in, on the other hand, refers to the insertion of words into an 
impugned legislative text in order to render it constitutional, and thereby avert a dec-
laration of invalidity.
14
 Severance and reading-in are constitutional remedies - as op-
posed to reading strategies - commensurate with section 172(1)(b) of the Constitu-
tion which allows for "any order that is just and equitable" as an outcome of constitu-
tional adjudication. Severance or reading-in can be ordered on the strength of this 
provision. 
 
2 Statutes as allies of the Constitution 
 
A growing body of subsidiary constitutional legislation, designed to amplify and give 
more concrete effect to key provisions of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, has 
seen the light since 1994. In many (but not all) cases, the Constitution explicitly an-
ticipates, authorises and indeed requires the enactment of subsidiary statute law. 
                                                                                                                                       
33; Affordable Medicines Trust v Minister of Health 2005 6 BCLR 529 (CC); 2006 3 SA 247 (CC) 
para 36 n 31 where Ngcobo J observed that "it is by now axiomatic that, where possible, legisla-
tion ought to be construed in a manner that is consistent with the Constitution". Note, however, 
the following caveat in HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
2007 11 BCLR 1230 (SCA) para 7 per Combrinck JA: "The Constitution does not permit a court 
to strain the meaning of a statutory provision under its guise particularly when there is more than 
one constitutional value involved." 
12
 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook 66; Daniels v Campbell 2004 7 BCLR 735 (CC); 
2004 5 SA 331 (CC). 
13
 Coetzee v Government of the RSA, Matiso v Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison 1995 10 
BCLR 1382 (CC); 1995 4 SA 631 (CC) para 16; Case v Minister of Safety & Security, Curtis v 
Minister of Safety & Security 1996 5 BCLR 609 (CC); 1996 3 SA 617 (CC) para 1. 
14
 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1998 12 BCLR 1517 (CC); 
1999 1 SA 6 (CC); Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 9 BCLR 986 (CC); 
2002 6 SA 1 (CC); Daniels v Campbell 2004 7 BCLR 735 (CC); 2004 5 SA 331 (CC); Niemand v 
S 2002 3 BCLR 219 (CC); 2002 1 SA 21 (CC). 
L DU PLESSIS                                                                                      PER / PELJ 2011(14)4 
96 / 351 
 
Section 9(4), for instance, obliges the national legislature to enact legislation "to pre-
vent or prohibit unfair discrimination" while section 33(3), also in a mandatory man-
ner, enjoins the national legislature to enact legislation to give specific effect to rights 
and procedures associated with just administrative action. The Promotion of Equality 
and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act
15
 (PEPUDA) and the Promotion of Ad-
ministrative Justice Act
16
 (PAJA) were enacted to comply with the constitutional obli-
gations in sections 9(4) and 33(3) respectively. 
 
The Labour Relations Act
17
 (LRA)  was enacted "to give effect to and regulate the 
fundamental rights conferred by section 27" of the interim Constitution, but section 
27 neither explicitly required nor envisaged legislation amplifying and giving more 
concrete effect to it. Sections 23(5) and (6) of the 1996 Constitution do, however, 
envisage and authorise, in a permissive vein, legislation to regulate collective bar-
gaining and recognise union security arrangements contained in collective agree-
ments. 
 
A comparison of the PEPUDA, PAJA an LRA examples above shows that subsidiary 
constitutional legislation can be enacted pursuant to a constitutional obligation or a 
permissive constitutional authorisation or even of the national legislature's (and ar-
guably any other legislature's) own accord. There is a special relationship between 
the Constitution and this kind of legislation with consequences for the interpretation 
and application of both, irrespective of whether the subsidiary legislation was passed 
pursuant to an obligatory or permissive constitutional authorisation or of a legisla-
ture's own accord. 
 
First, a litigant taking action because of an alleged infringement of a constitutional 
right (or rights) to which a subsidiary statute gives more concrete effect, cannot cir-
                                            
15
 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000. 
16 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. This act is closely associated with the Promo-
tion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA) which was also enacted as an "ally to the 
Constitution" to give effect to the right of access to information entrenched in s 32(1) of the Con-
stitution. 
17
 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. 
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cumvent the statute "by attempting to rely directly on the constitutional right".
18
 This 
is a straightforward instance of what I call adjudicative subsidiarity, commensurate 
with the following dictum of Kentridge AJ in S v Mhlungu:
19
 "I would lay it down as a 
general principle that where it is possible to decide any case, civil or criminal, without 
reaching a constitutional issue, that is the course which should be followed." 
 
Second, the provisions of a subsidiary constitutional statute must, like any other 
statute, be construed to promote the spirit, purport and objects of both the Bill of 
Rights, and the specific constitutional provision(s) to which more concrete effect is 
given. The said provisions may also not be allowed to decrease the protection that a 
constitutional right affords or to infringe any other constitutional right.
20
 
 
A subsidiary constitutional statute may, in the third place, "extend protection beyond 
what is conferred by" the constitutional provisions to which it is subsidiary.
21
 
 
From the discussion above it is abundantly clear that subsidiary constitutional legis-
lation enjoys a considerable status and has a very special role to play in the fulfil-
ment of crucial constitutional objectives. It is therefore an indispensible ally of the 
Constitution. 
 
3 Popular participation in legislative deliberation 
 
Since Middelburg Municipality v Gertzen
22
 it has been readily accepted that the 
status of legislation is largely determined by the degree to which its adoption resulted 
from deliberation. Because provincial councils were deliberative law-makers provin-
cial ordinances enacted between 31 May 1910 and 1 July 1986, though always sub-
                                            
18
 MEC for Education: KwaZulu Natal v Pillay 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 1 SA 474 (CC). Cf also 
South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence 2007 8 BCLR 863 (CC); 2007 5 SA 
400 (CC) para 51. 
19 
S v Mhlungu 1995 7 BCLR 793 (CC); 1995 3 SA 867 (CC) para 59. 
20 
Department of Land Affairs v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd 2007 10 BCLR 1027 (CC); 
2007 6 SA 199 (CC) para 53 per Moseneke DCJ. 
21 
MEC for Education: KwaZulu Natal v Pillay 2008 2 BCLR 99 (CC); 2008 1 SA 474 (CC) para43. 
22
 Middelburg Municipality v Gertzen 1914 AD 544. 
L DU PLESSIS                                                                                      PER / PELJ 2011(14)4 
98 / 351 
 
ordinate to parliamentary legislation, were, for example, by virtue of the Gertzen 
judgment, original - as opposed to delegated - legislation. Laws democratically made 
thus command appropriate respect, and it is significant that the Constitutional Court 
has understood both the transitional and the final constitutions to invest municipal 
councils, who were delegated legislatures before 27 April 1994, with an original leg-
islative competence.
23
 
 
The Constitution requires, in addition to "conventional" forms of deliberation accom-
panying the adoption of parliamentary legislation, the National Assembly to facilitate 
public involvement in the legislative and other processes of the Assembly and its 
committees.
24
 The National Council of Provinces
25
 and provincial legislatures
26
 are 
under a similar (what has been held to be) constitutional obligation. The Constitu-
tional Court has required meticulous compliance with these exigencies of participa-
tory democracy, and has looked on non- or insufficient compliance as the legislative 
breach of a constitutional obligation.
27
 Section 4 of PAJA, in a similar way, provides 
for public participation in the making of delegated legislation.
28
 Duly putting any legis-
lation in the process of adoption through its paces of public participation, greatly en-
hances its eventual status and stature as a source of law. 
 
4 In conclusion 
 
"Statutory interpretation is the Cinderella of legal scholarship." What William 
Eskridge
29
 here says about the interpretation of statutes as a legal discipline is also a 
                                            
23
 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council 1998 12 
BCLR 1458 (CC); 1999 1 SA 374 (CC) para 41. 
24
 Section 59(1)(a) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
25
 Section 72(1) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
26
 Section 118(1) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
27 
Cf eg Matatiele Municipality v President of the Republic of South Africa (1) 2006 5 BCLR 622 
(CC); 2006 5 SA 47 (CC); Doctors for Life v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 12 BCLR 
1399 (CC); 2006 6 SA 416 (CC); Matatiele Municipality v President of the Republic of South Af-
rica (2) 2007 1 BCLR 47 (CC). Cf also King v Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control 2006 4 
BCLR 462 (SCA); 2006 1 SA 474 (SCA). 
28
 Hoexter Administrative Law 81-83. 
29
 Eskridge Dynamic Statutory Interpretation Press 1. 
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reflection of the status of statute law itself, for as Jeremy Waldron
30
 reminds us: 
"Legislation and legislatures have a bad name in legal and political philosophy, a 
name sufficiently disreputable to cast doubt on their credentials as respectable 
sources of law." Eskridge, however, also sees light for the Cinderella discipline: 
"Once scorned and neglected, confined to the kitchen, it now dances in the ball-
room."
31
 And legislation then? 
 
Just imagine that legislation herself was the Cinderella in Eskridge's story, then we 
here in South Africa might, from bitter experience, warn: "Watch her! Tame her - lest 
she grows up to become an angry and vengeful Amazon!" We have seen a form of 
social engineering in this country - Apartheid was its name - which would have been 
impossible without…legislation! And now we are rebuilding our country and trans-
forming our society and its institutions, and in the course of it all legislation is coming 
strongly to the fore! So what are we heading for? A post-apartheid Amazon? 
 
I trust not. The Amazon of Apartheid grew under and drew her strength from the 
sovereignty of a biased minority parliament. Present day legislation is heading for its 
heyday, but under the discipline, guidance and authority of a supreme Constitution. I 
would suggest that all of us working with legislation should carry this message fur-
ther, and canvass its implications. I trust that this note has planted but a tiny seedling 
to this effect. 
                                            
30
 Waldron Dignity of Legislation 1. 
31
 Waldron Dignity of Legislation 1. 
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